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A JUDGE VIEWS
THE M'NAGHTEN RULE
PETER

O

T.

FARRELL*

UR DISCUSSIONS concerning the efficacy of the M'Naghten formula

are indeed timely. It may be reasonably expected that the Report
of the Governor's Conference on the Defense of Insanity' will induce
prompt consideration of this important problem at the next session of
our State Legislature. Accordingly, it is fortunate that there is presently
available a wealth of information on all facets of the controversy, the
constructive results of the labors of many lawyers, criminologists and
psychiatrists. 2 The necessity of a full and frank discussion of this matter,
so vital to the proper administration of justice, has been apparent to
many informed students of the problem for many years.
The so-called "right-and-wrong" rule, now statutory in at least twentynine states of our union, has had its rigorous advocates as well as its
belligerent opponents. Shortly before the original M'Naghten case arose
in England in 1843, Dr. Isaac Ray, a prominent student of criminal
insanity of that era, indicated conclusions directly at variance with the
formula subsequently adopted 3 as a result of that famous trial. It was
his collaboration with Judge Doe that was responsible for the pronouncement of the New Hampshire rule, 4 now regarded as the sire of the
Durham "product" rule. Dr. Ray's theories are still being defended by
many articulate disciples of the present day.
A.B. (1922), Cornell University; LL.B. (1925), Fordham University. Adminis-

trative and Senior Member, Queens County Court.
I GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY, (April 1958).

2 See Hofstadter & Levittan, The M'Naghten Rules - A Reappraisaland Proposal,
N.Y.L.J. Sept. 15-19, 1958, p. 4, col. 1.
3 RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 263 (1838).
4 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
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The promulgation of the M'Naghten
formula, the New Hampshire rule and the
irresistible impulse norm, preceded the
writings of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939),
commonly accepted as the progenitor of
modern psychiatry. As Freud's theories
were elucidated, psychiatry and psychology
each acquired a commonly accepted professional autonomy. The practitioners in
each field' increased in number and- the
motivation and causation of human behavior inherent in the commission of crime
properly received their attention. Whether
it is caused by the natural tensions implicit
in our highly developed civilization or is the
result of the natural groping by the average
citizen for an answer to the complex predicaments of everyday existence, it is apparent that a large section of public opinion
is presently psychiatrically oriented. It is the
fashion of the age to seek a psychological
and psychiatric answer to the problems of
human experience. Some segments of the
population appear to regard the psychiatrist
as a sort of spiritual leader, who has
stepped into the role formerly occupied by
the priest or ministei on the one hand and
by the political innovator on the other.
This is the social climate within which the
use of psychiatric expert testimony in courts
of law operates."
That psychiatry can make constructive
contributions to the efficiency of the administration of justice in many respects is commonly understood by lawyers and judges.
The efficiency of the criminal court sentence procedure is determined in large
measure by the accuracy of the antecedent
5 See Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in
the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 956 (1952).
6 Szasz, Psychiatric Expert Testimony, 20 J. OF
INTERPERSONAL
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investigation, where an inquiry as to the
motivation for the crime, the results of
psychological tests and, in many instances,
psychiatric examinations of the defendant
are necessary ingredients. Hence the common complaint by judges that budgetary
authorities have failed to provide adequate
psychiatric diagnostic and therapeutical
clinical facilities in their salutary effort to
prevent recidivism by law violators. The
hostile or uninformed lawyer-critic of psychiatry, so distasteful to members of his
profession, is a rare exception in modern
7
jurisprudence.
If there is presently an abyss between
the law and psychiatry," resulting from
trials involving the issue of criminal insanity, an enlightened age requires that every
effort be made to bidge the gulf of difficulty. One basic requirement in that endeavor is a realization of the proper domain
of each discipline. An autocracy of law is
as repugnant to fair discussion as what an
eminent psychiatrist has called "psycho9
authoritarianism."
The law must take cognizance of the
accepted modern advances of psychiatry.
Our understanding of the conditions under
which men act has been clarified by the
evaluations of psychiatry and many other
7 "We all know how intense is the hostility which
at times is displayed in our courts between the
jurist and the psychiatric expert. A highly respected and very just federal judge once addressed me as I was sworn in as an expert witness:
'I don't like doctors; they talk a language which
we don't understand. Please, Doctor, bear this
in mind and talk plainly so that we can understand you'." ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 106-07 (1954).
8 See Morris, Criminal Insanity: The Abyss
Between Law and Psychiatry, 12 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 171 (Nov. 1957).
9 See Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianismand the
Law, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 336 (1955).
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disciplines since the M'Naghten formula
was established. If the present rule prevents
a qualified witness from explaining to a
jury the complete mental picture of the
defendant that his diagnosis has developed,
then the psychiatrist has a reasonable complaint. If the word "know," used in our
formula, should be interpreted in the light
of commonly accepted principle as meaning
more than surface knowledge and requiring
perception in depth, then the psychiatrist
should be permitted to so testify. Certainly,
the proper ends of justice should permit
him to explain a diagnosis of impairment
of volition which, with cognition, is a component of ordinary human judgment. The
law is intended to be dynamic and the
present controversy should not degenerate
into crude semantics.
The professional psychiatrist is a witness
whose proper testimony is necessary for the
information of the jury when insanity is an
issue. But his function is to give opinion
evidence. The issue before the criminal
court is not mental disorder but legal
responsibility, a fact which the legal profession has been pointing out to its medical
critics for years. 10
The common concern of doctors for
those whom they diagnose and treat for
mental ills is a commendable professional
attribute. But it has no more proper place
in a trial than the solicitude of the devoted
criminal court lawyer whose conviction as
to the righteousness of his defendant's contention often induces a belligerency seldom
excused by either the judge or the jury. The
psychiatrist's activity in criminology has
too often been characterized by an ethical
premise which places the doctor in the role
10

See Weihofen,

The Flowering of New Hamp-

shire, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 356, 359 (1955).

of the protector of the accused. Thus, the
offender is elevated from the role of "criminal" to that of "patient."" In many instances psychiatric diagnosis proceeds from
the premise that all law offenders are sick
people - ". . . that criminology is an expression of an inner drive rather than
something willfully premeditated; that it
represents impulsive behavior; and that the
criminal is more often weak than vicious.
12
Punishment is not a deterrent of crime.
If psychiatrists complain that in the
courtroom they are cast in the role of partisan hirelings whose professional competence and integrity are impugned 13 part of
the fault is undoubtedly theirs. They resent
the cross-examination which often damages
their direct testimony, ignoring its value to
the fact-finding jury. Since their discipline
deals with intangibles, their claim to status
as a science is commonly disputed even by
some of their eminent number. It has been
said that to a large extent psychiatry is still
an art and that although there are wide
areas of agreement on basic facts, there is
a considerable disagreement once one gets
14
beyond these.
When insanity is an issue in a trial, the
attitude of the average juror is often one
of ambivalence. In his private professional
relations, the average juror has more respect
for his doctor than his lawyer. Consequently, when he hears a psychiatrist, testifying for the prosecution, state that a
11 See Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics and the Criminal
Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 183 (1958).
12 Karpman, On Reducing Tensions and Bridging
Gaps Between Psychiatry and the Law, 48 J.
CRIM. L., C. & PS. 164 (1957).
1

3Guttmacher, Why Psychiatrists Do Not Like to
Testify in Court, PRACTICAL LAWYER, 50, 52
(May 1955).
14 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham
Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 25 (1955).
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a clash of lawyers, with psychiatrists in the

a standard of moral responsibility to protect
its safety. It will not countenance any rule
on criminal responsibility which links human actions more often to material forces
and mass controls than to spiritual personality and individual responsibility. It insists
that responsibility should be the usual norm
and excuse the challenged exception. As it
enters the domain of the law, psychiatry
must take cognizance of the ethics inherent
in our jurisprudence, despite the common
suspicion that some systems of psychiatry
have severed all relationships with morality. 1 9
Since our criminal law is based on the

role of baseball bats," 1

one answer could

assumption of free will, 20 it cannot properly

be that they become "baseball bats" because
of an inability to agree on fundamentals in

digest the deterministic theories of some
schools of psychiatric thought. 2' Even
though "[psychiatrists] don't believe in the
22
society will
propriety of punishment,"
hardly accept the elimination of the elements of punishment or retribution as an
effective deterrent. Our proper perspective
of the role of psychiatry in the criminal law
should not be blurred by an argument over
punishment nor deflected by the separate
question of the efficacy of the mandatory
death sentence for the commission of certain crimes of murder in the first degree.
As has been said, the assault on the "rightand-wrong" rule is sometimes regarded as
principally a flank attack on capital punishment. 2

defendant had neither mental defect or
disease and another equally qualified psychiatrist testify that a defendant suffers from
hebephrenic schizophrenia, 15 he may, despite his respect for the profession, wonder
how accurate is a claimed science which
produces such a dichotomy of opinion.' 6
An ethical code that would insure standards of professional competence among
psychiatrists would dissipate much of the
distrust of their testimony in our court
trials. 17 If their profession complains that
"what happens to psychiatrists in the courtroom is actually not a clash of opinion but

diagnosis and for failure to enforce their
own compulsory moral code for practi-

tioners. A criminal trial is not the usual
scientific inquiry that scientists conduct. In
their field, preponderance of the evidence
may suffice and majority opinion prevails;

in a criminal trial, because of the human
values at stake, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt by a unanimous verdict is required.
Far transcending the confidence of psy-

chiatry in its own norms and its natural
compassion for a "sick" defendant is the
concern of society as a group for the victim

of the crime and the victims of others whose
actions he may inspire. Society insists upon
15 "Hebephrenia. A clinical form of dementia
praecox . . . coming on soon after the onset of
puberty and marked by rapid deterioration, hallucinations, absurd delusion, senseless laughter, and
silly mannerisms." AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1943).

16 See Trial Record, People v. Yaeger (Queens
County June 1958).
17

See

ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMI-

NAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT

18

1d. at 112.

124 (1954).

19 VANDERVELT

& ODENWALD, PSYCHIATRY

CATHOLICISM 15 (1957).
20 GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN,

AND

PSYCHIATRY AND

THE LAW 408 (1952).
21 See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMI-

NAL LAW 526 (1947).
22
Hall & Menninger, "Psychiatry and the Law"

-

A Dual Review, 38 IOWA L. REV. 687, 702 (1953).

23 See Snyder, What is Wrong A bout the M'Naghten Rule and Who Cares? 23 BROOKLYN L. REV.

1, 19 (1956).

A

JUDGE'S VIEW

The irresistible impulse norm was, for a
time, presented as an example of the "uniform" opinion of psychiatrists of criminal
responsibility and yet today it is rejected by
most of them as unsound.2 4 The promulgation of the Durham "product" rule in 1954,
although not subsequently followed in two
jurisdictions of equal level,'2 , was hailed by
many psychiatrists with enthusiasm. 21; Its
soundness, however, has since been widely
disputed 27 by many students of the problem
of criminal insanity and it is rejected as a
proper test in the report of Governor Harriman's Commission. 2 8 Since it must have the
standard of stability, our law cannot embody any psychiatric norm that is either
fadistic or too variable. The abolition of
a legal test of criminal liability and the substitution of the diagnosis of mental illness
for the moral responsibility inherent in the
M'Naghten formula represents strenuous
objection to most proposed changes. It is
24

See Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsi-

bility, 65 YALE L. J. 761, 772-74 (1956).
25 See Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274
(5th Cir. 1956); Andersen v. United States, 237
F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956).
26 See Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness, 22 U. Cmt. L. REV. 325 (1955);
Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, id.
at 331.
27 Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of
the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956);
Wechsler, The Criteriaof CriminalResponsibility,
22 U. CMt. L. REV. 367-76 (1955).
28 "It
should be added that in framing our recommendation we gave consideration to the principle formulated in the Durham case, which would
refer responsibility solely to whether the criminal
act was the product of mental disease or defect.
While we appreciate the value of this concept as
opposed to strict McNaghten, and its usefulness
in freeing psychiatric testimony from the arbitrary limits now imposed, no member of the
Study Committee would prefer its adoption to the
formulation we propose." GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DEFENSE OF INSANrrY 7
(April 1958).

suggested that the proposal of the Governor's Commission has this grave handicap
and will not even satisfy many medical
critics of the present rule.2 9 The dangers
inherent in the elastic connotation of the
words "mental disease or defect," "substantial capacity" and "result" used in this
suggestion are apparent.
The M'Naghten formula embodies the
moral orientation that society requires to
accomplish substantial justice. Serious criticisms of the unfair application of its tenets,
exemplified in the case of People v. Horton 0 can be met by increasing the scope of
proper psychiatric testimony and broadening the context of the court's instruction
to the jury. The psychiatrist is entitled to a
proper respect for his professional standing
in the courtroom and it is often unfair to
put him "on the rack" by compelling a
compulsory "yes" or "no" answer. Judicial
intrusion in the interrogation at trial, compelling this procedure, often connotes to a
jury an unfair distrust for the validity of
elementary psychiatric principles. Not every
mental condition can be characterized as
"black" or "white." There are shades of
"gray" - the mixtures of neuroses and
psychoses which dictates of justice require
should be explained to the jury by the psychiatric expert.
Whether the accomplishment of these
changes should be left to the slow evolution
of decisional law is questionable. An immediate amendment to the Code of Criminal
Procedure of our state could define the
mechanics and limit judicial discretion in
the matter. Such a change would make the
Hofstadter & Levittan, The M"Naghten Rules A Reappraisal and Proposal, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 15-19,
1958, p. 4, col. 1, particularly the issue of September 17, 1958.
40308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E. 2d 609 (1954).
21)

4
M'Naghten formula more consonant with
presently accepted psychiatric principles.
At the same time, legislative consideration
could be given to two salutary proposals one in the report of the Governor's
Commission and the other contained
in Justice Hofstadter's New York Law
Journal article. 31 The present statutory provision that defendants acquitted by a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
are confined by judicial discretion, under
Section 454 of the Code, "until sane" is
truly inadequate for the protection of the
public. The adoption of a post-trial procedure after such verdicts, contained in
Section 4.08 of the proposed Model Penal
Code, the salutary work of the American
Law Institute, would be an improvement.
Embodied in this plan is an answer to a
common jury concern as to how society
can cope with possible recidivism by mentally sick defendants, often too early re32
leased from custody.
One of Justice Hofstadter's suggestions
provides for a Board of Disposition to convene and hold a hearing after a verdict of
31 See note 29 supra.
32 GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE DE-

FENSE OF INSANITY, supra

note 28.
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guilty resulting from a trial where sanity
has been in issue. More comprehensive
medical and other testimony could be
heard than that adduced at the trial with
specific emphasis on consideration of the
defendant as an individual allegedly mentally disturbed.
Under our system of law, juries determine responsibility, and their duty can
more properly be discharged if our procedure more adequately defined the scope
of their fact-finding function. No matter
how explicit and direct is the court's charge
that they must not consider what will happen after the rendition of their verdict,
natural human speculation compels the
jurymen's concern with the overtones involved in the commission of crimes by
mentally disturbed defendants and society's
stake in the aftermath.
The law has, through centuries of experience with the fallibilities of human nature,
acquired substantial knowledge of human
behavior. The basic retention of the
M'Naghten formula with the changes proposed will, it is submitted, afford protection
to society and include proper solicitude for
the individual in the light of our present
knowledge, scientific and otherwise.

